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Articles 
The right of the child to be heard? Professional 
experiences of child care proceedings in the Irish 
district court 
The right of the child to be heard? Professional experiences of child care 
proceedings in the Irish district court 
Aisling Parkes, Caroline Shore, Conor O’Mahony and Kenneth Burns* 
Introduction 
Sparked by the adoption and entry into force of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 1989 (UNCRC) at international level, there has been a growing awareness 
internationally of the requirement to include the voices of children in all matters affecting 
them – a right protected under Article 12 of the Convention. While this fundamental right of 
the child is no longer as contested as it once was, the real challenge now lies in determining 
how and when this right should be implemented in practice. The focus of this article is on 
child care proceedings in the District Court in Ireland, where decisions are made about 
whether children should continue to live with their parents or come into state care. The paper 
explores the extent to which children participate directly or indirectly in child care 
proceedings in Ireland, which take place within what is, for the most part, an adversarial 
context: a system designed by and for adults, and which is exclusively run by adults. Thus, 
the extent to which the current system is child-centred in terms of its design and operation is 
an issue that merits detailed consideration.  
In recent times, with the increased attention given to children’s rights generally, and the 
undisputed need to adopt a more child-centred approach in such cases, a question arises 
regarding the extent to which a traditional court-centric, judge-led, adversarial approach 
involves children in such proceedings in a meaningful way. Indeed, this paper will argue that 
there is no one homogenous child care proceedings model in Ireland, and that there are a 
variety of ways through which the voices of children are included in such cases in various 
regions. Based on a national empirical study conducted across the Republic of Ireland, this 
article provides a snapshot of the current child care proceedings system, with a particular 
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emphasis on the extent to which children are heard in care proceedings affecting them. The 
current international and domestic legal frameworks will be explored, as will the practical 
implementation of the law in the day-to-day operation of the system from the perspective of 
the professionals involved. In particular, this article aims to highlight a number of issues in 
the Irish context by posing the following questions: To what extent does Irish law, in 
particular, under the Child Care Act 1991 and the Irish Constitution 1937, support children 
having a voice in child care proceedings in the District Court in accordance with the 
minimum standards set out under Article 12 UNCRC? To what extent are children heard in 
these cases in practice? If children are heard, what direct and indirect methods are used to 
facilitate their participation? What factors influence whether and how children are heard in 
these proceedings?  
This article will begin by setting out Ireland’s international legal commitments as far as 
listening to children in child care proceedings is concerned. It will then go on to examine the 
domestic legal framework underpinning the existing Irish child care proceedings model. The 
design, methodology and findings of a national research study undertaken in Ireland on the 
professional perspectives of those working in the child care system on a day-to-day basis will 
then be examined. This article will conclude by measuring the extent to which Ireland meets 
its international legal obligations as set out by Article 12 UNCRC in practice in the context of 
child care proceedings specifically. 
Ireland’s international legal commitments 
In September 1992, Ireland became a party to the UNCRC, thereby committing to 
implementing the principles and provisions contained therein into Irish domestic law and 
practice. While in some ways it merely sets out basic minimum rights to which children are 
entitled, the UNCRC nevertheless represents the gold standard in terms of how we view our 
children in today’s society. It ultimately reflects the global move away from paternalism 
towards a child rights-based approach. There are 41 substantive rights under the UNCRC to 
which all children are entitled.1 There are four general guiding principles under the UNCRC: 
the principle of non-discrimination (Article 2); the best interests’ principle (Article 3); the 
right of the child to life, survival and development (Article 6); and the right of the child to be 
heard (Article 12), all of which underpin the implementation of all Convention provisions. 
Article 13 UNCRC recognises the child’s right to freedom of expression and in particular, 
highlights the importance of facilitating alternative forms of expression beyond the traditional 
form of conventional speech. This provision requires some level of creativity in ensuring that 
children can effectively express themselves in practice. Given the holistic nature of the 
UNCRC, each of these principles and provisions must be adhered to when implementing the 
other rights set out in the UNCRC.  
Article 12, which enshrines the principle of respect for the views of the child, serves as a 
linchpin for the UNCRC.2 It sets one of the fundamental values of the Convention, as well as 
one of its most basic challenges. Indeed, as a general principle, Article 12 lies at the heart of 
the UNCRC, and provides a means through which children can exercise all of the other rights 
                                                          
1 There are 196 States Parties to the UNCRC, all of which have committed to implementing the rights of children in their 
domestic law. The only jurisdiction in the world who is not a party to the UNCRC is the USA. Somalia finally ratified the 
UNCRC in January 2015 and South Sudan in April 2015. See: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?Treaty=CRC&Lang=en for more information.  
2 M Freeman (ed), Law and Childhood Studies: Current Legal Issues, Vol 14 (Oxford University Press, 2012), p 7.  
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contained therein.  
Article 12 provides: 
‘12(1) States parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her 
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the 
views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and 
maturity of the child.  
12(2) For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to 
be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either 
directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner 
consistent with the procedural rules of national law.’ 
According to Article 12(1) and (2), every child in Ireland, without discrimination, should 
have the right to express his or her views in all decisions concerning him or her. Expression 
may be in the form of conventional speech as well as through alternative forms of expression 
such as through art or play in accordance with Article 13. One fundamental decision affecting 
children is where they will live and who will care for them. While Article 12(1) clearly sets 
out the general right of children to be heard in all matters affecting them, Article 12(2) of the 
UNCRC specifically provides children and young people with the procedural capacity to be 
heard in legal proceedings, either directly before the decision-maker or indirectly, through a 
representative (such as parent, a solicitor, a social worker or a guardian ad litem (GAL)3) or 
through an appropriate body.4 In order for child participation to be meaningful, it is essential 
that children are provided with child-appropriate information concerning the decision being 
made and the space for participation must also be safe and child friendly. Indeed, it has been 
acknowledged in the context of Article 12(2) that there is a need to adapt courts and other 
formal decision-making bodies to enable children to freely express views in legal 
proceedings. In terms of court hearings, for example, this could involve more informality in 
the physical design of the courtroom. The clothing of judges and lawyers should also be less 
formal and evidence could be video-taped.5  
Irish child care proceedings – the legal framework 
Since Ireland is a dualist legal system, an international treaty must be incorporated into the 
domestic law of the state before it can be directly relied upon before the Irish courts.6 To 
date, the UNCRC has not been comprehensively enshrined within Irish domestic law. That 
said, there are elements of this international agreement that have been partially integrated into 
Irish legislation by way of sectoral legislation and more recently, the Irish Constitution 
(Article 42A), which affects children either directly or indirectly. In the area of child 
protection and welfare, the Child Care Act 1991 (as amended) remains the primary piece of 
legislation. It supplements Article 42A.2.1 of the Irish Constitution, which is currently the 
principal legal basis for state intervention in the family through child care proceedings in the 
                                                          
3 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 12 (2009): The Right of the Child to be Heard, UN Doc 
CRC/C/GC/12, 20 July 2009, at para 36. 
4 M Fernando, ‘How Can We Best Listen to Children in Family Law Proceedings?’ [2013] New Zealand Law Review 387. 
5 Op cit n 3, at para 34. 
6 Article 29.6 of the Irish Constitution provides: ‘No international agreement shall be part of the domestic law of the State 
save as may be determined by the Oireachtas [Parliament]’. 
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District Court. While Articles 41 and 427 explicitly recognise the rights and responsibilities 
of parents, Article 42A.2.1 provides: 
‘In exceptional cases, where the parents, regardless of their marital status, fail in 
their duty towards their children to such extent that the safety or welfare of any of 
their children is likely to be prejudicially affected, the State as guardian of the 
common good shall, by proportionate means as provided by law, endeavour to 
supply the place of the parents, but always with due regard for the natural and 
imprescriptible rights of the child.’ 
The 1991 Act sets out the legal principles and procedures to be followed for these exceptional 
cases and contains provisions which are partially reflective of some of the rights contained in 
the UNCRC, including the best interests’ principle and the principle of respect for the views 
of the child. For example, the Child Care Act 1991 obliges the Child and Family Agency 
(CFA) and the courts to regard the welfare of the child as the first and paramount 
consideration when performing its functions. It also requires that the CFA give due 
consideration, having regard to his age and understanding, to the wishes of the child.8 It is 
worth noting, however, that children are not automatically parties to the proceedings, they do 
not have an automatic right to attend and they are not guaranteed the appointment of a GAL 
to represent their views and interests. Indeed in considering the best interests and views of 
children, the court is required to have regard to the rights and duties of parents as recognised 
under the Constitution or otherwise. Thus, while Irish legislation clearly reflects some of the 
rights and fundamental principles set down in the UNCRC, the extent to which they are 
implemented in practice is less clear-cut; this article will attempt to shed some light on this 
issue. 
Research design and methodology 
Research sample and data collection 
This paper is based on a national, independent qualitative study which took place between 
November 2011 and February 2015. It explores professional perspectives on child care 
proceedings across three counties in Ireland. Taken together, these counties account for over 
50% of the applications for child protection orders made in the District Court in any given 
year. The professions represented consisted of guardians ad litem, social workers, judges, 
barristers and solicitors. A purposive sample of each core profession regularly involved in 
these proceedings was invited to participate. This ensured that all participants had the 
requisite experience to inform their perspective on this topic. A total of 67 individuals took 
part; 54 female and 13 male participants. Participants’ practice experience in child care 
                                                          
7 Article 41 of the Irish Constitution recognises the family (defined as the marital family) as ‘the natural primary and 
fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent 
and superior to all positive law’, and provides that ‘[t]he State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution 
and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the State’. Article 
42 builds on this by providing that ‘the primary and natural educator of the child is the Family’, and that the state ‘guarantees 
to respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, according to their means, for the religious and moral, 
intellectual, physical and social education of their children’. 
8 Section 3(2)(b). For more in-depth data on children in care and a description of care orders in Ireland, see: K Burns, C 
O’Mahony, C Shore and A Parkes, ‘Child removal decision-making systems in Ireland: Law, policy and practice’ in K 
Burns, T Pösö and M Skivenes (eds), Taking Children into State Care: A Cross Country Analysis of Socio-Legal Decision-
Making Systems (Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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Table 2: Overview of professional participants in the study 
Profession / role Agency Number of 
participants 
Child protection and welfare social workers 
(practitioners and managers) 
Child and Family Agency 
(CFA) 
30 
District Court Judges Courts Service 8 
Guardians ad litem Barnardos* 10 
Solicitors representing parents Legal Aid Board 7 
Solicitors representing either parents, children/young 
people and/or guardians ad litem 
Private law firms 4 
Solicitors representing the Child and Family Agency Private law firms 4 
Barristers Self employed 4 
 Total participants 67 
*Guardians ad litem for this project were sourced from Barnardos as this agency provides the largest number of 
GALs in the country. 
TableEnd 
Participants were engaged in an informed consent process that explored the aims of the study, 
data storage and anonymity.9 The data was collected through focus groups and semi-
structured interviews.10 
Limitation of the study sample 
Due to the restrictions posed by the operation of the in camera rule11 and the unique ethical 
                                                          
9 Participants are not identified by name in the findings section and some of the data has been further anonymised to avoid 
the participants being identified. In addition to participants’ permissions, institutional permissions were also secured. The 
Social Research Ethics Committee at the authors’ academic institution provided ethical approval. 
10 The audio and transcript data were stored on a secure university server. The data was coded in research pairs (one social 
work and one legal academic) using a thematic coding framework and NVivo 10. 
11 Cases involving children are heard in private (in camera) to protect their identity and the privacy of the family. Only 
officers of the court, the parties to the case and their legal representatives, witnesses and such other people as the judge 
allows will be in the courtroom while the case is being heard. Article 31 of the Child Care Act 1991 states that no matter 
likely to identify the child shall be published in a written publication or be broadcast. Section 40 of the Civil Liability and 
Courts Act 2004 allows solicitors, barristers and certain other categories of people approved by the Minister for Justice 
and Equality to attend family law cases and publish reports. Part 2 (sections 3 to 12) of the Courts and Civil Law 
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considerations associated with the sensitive nature of children being removed from their 
families, no children, young people or parents were invited to take part in this phase of the 
study. The researchers are cognisant of the irony inherent in an article focusing on child 
participation, drawn from a study that did not include any children as participants. However, 
the lack of clarity around the in camera rule, which is poorly defined in Irish law, meant that 
it was not possible to include children who had been the subject of child care proceedings, 
without the researchers being at risk of being in contempt of court. Consequently, the 
experiences of children can only be represented through the perspectives and voices of the 
adult professional participants. We have communicated with the Minister for Justice and 
Equality and the Minister for Children and Youth Affairs on the need for clarity on this issue. 
Pre-requisites to effective involvement – information and 
environment 
According to the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General Comment on Article 
12, there are two essential pre-requisites to children and young people being effectively heard 
in court proceedings.12 First, in order to adequately prepare the child for contributing their 
views in an informed way, information concerning the decision must be provided to the child 
in advance of the decision-making process. This information must be child-appropriate and 
must be provided all the way throughout the proceedings. Second, children must have a safe 
space within which to contribute their views where they are not subject to fear or intimidation 
in the surrounding environment. These will be discussed in turn. 
Information 
At international level, it has been acknowledged that in order to ensure that the child can 
effectively express his or her views freely, it is imperative that they are fully informed ‘about 
the matters, options and possible decisions to be taken and their consequences by those who 
are responsible for hearing the child, and by the child’s parents or guardian. The child must 
also be informed about the conditions under which she or he will be asked to express his or 
her views’.13  
Within our study, it was the position of some professionals that children are well informed of 
the circumstances surrounding the proceedings, and the court process: 
‘I think children are extremely aware of what’s going on, you know, they are 
aware of social workers calling to the house. They’re aware of the changes in 
their care arrangements … The social workers will be talking to the child and 
then if the court appoints a guardian the guardian will be talking to the child and 
then there will usually be some form of assessment phase that’s begun so there’ll 
be Lord knows how many professionals talking to the child.’ (Judge, County 2) 
Some practitioners indicated what they do to inform children about the process: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013 makes further provision for bona fide representatives of the press attend family law 
cases (subject to the right of the judge to exclude any such representatives) and to publish reports. The publication of reports 
of family law cases is allowed under this legislation provided no names, addresses or any other details which might identify 
the parties are used. 
12 Op cit n 3, at para 41(a). 
13 Op cit n 3, at para 25. 
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‘I usually draw pictures depicting the judge telling who is in court and I would 
have that conversation with them and, again, I would feed it back to the social 
worker maybe to go back on it with the child and see if the child has any more 
questions about that.’ (GAL, County 3) 
However, this was far from a universal approach amongst participants. Perhaps more 
strikingly, there was no consensus concerning whether every child even had the right to be 
informed about the matters that affect him or her: 
‘… at times I’ve had the judge say you know there should be no discussion with 
young children about a court process because how do they understand anyway 
and I’ve heard Judge [name removed] state to parents, “you will not discuss court 
with your children in relation to care” … but it’s about them so I have … and I 
suppose how do you get around to saying “well look this is actually impacted on 
your life but I’m not allowed to talk to you about it?”’ (Social Worker, County 1) 
Indeed, some participants expressed views which could be considered paternalistic in nature: 
‘I don’t think it’s a child-centred thing for them to have to do. Kids should be 
carefree and you know not even be aware this court process is going on.’ (Social 
Worker, County 2) 
These findings give rise to concerns from the outset as to whether children are provided with 
the information necessary to understand the nature of child care proceedings, which may 
undermine their ability to participate in such proceedings in a meaningful way should this 
opportunity be offered to them. 
Environment 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has stated that a child should never be heard in 
open court; their participation should take place under conditions of confidentiality.14 The 
Child Care Act 1991 attempts to achieve this end through the in camera rule, which provides 
that proceedings under the Act shall be held in camera so as to protect the privacy of the 
parties involved.15 The Act makes it an offence to publish or broadcast any material likely to 
lead members of the public to identify the children who are the subjects of child care 
proceedings.16 Although the in camera rule may ensure that the hearing of the details of the 
case, and any actual evidence given directly by the child, will be strictly confidential, the 
effectiveness of this rule does not, in practice, extend past the physical boundary of the 
courtroom door. If children are brought to the court, they wait in the same public waiting 
areas with other attendees. These waiting areas are shared spaces, often including people 
attending for criminal and/or civil proceedings as well as those for a number of individual 
child care cases. In most Irish courts, there is very rarely any opportunity for privacy, and 
those children present are visible to anyone in attendance, and sometimes even to members of 
the public simply walking past the courthouse. This situation, which has also been 
documented in other jurisdictions,17 gives rise to confidentiality concerns from a number of 
                                                          
14 Op cit n 3, at para 43. 
15 Section 29(1). 
16 Section 31. 
17 See, for example, R Sheehan and A Borowski, ‘Australia’s Children’s Courts: An assessment of the status of and 
challenges facing the child welfare jurisdiction in Victoria’ (2014) 36(2) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 95, at p 
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perspectives: 
‘With lots of young people how can they have their confidentiality and their 
privacy respected when they see young people down outside the court that they 
actually know from another residential unit or you know that sometimes things 
can get very messy because they’re all put together at the same time … the 
chances of them knowing each other is extremely high’ (GAL, County 1) 
Due to overcrowding in court waiting areas and the lack of private spaces in which 
consultations between clients and their legal representatives, social workers and children may 
take place, details of a child’s personal circumstances may well be overheard by other people 
who have no connection to or involvement with that child’s life:  
‘You are actually packed like sardines into this really small space and it’s quite an 
intense space, you know, because you’ve social workers there, you’ve parents 
there, you’ve young people there … There’s nothing anonymous about it … 
you’ve solicitors having consultations surrounded by sort of a dozen ears’ (Social 
Worker, County 1) 
‘… like we’re reading reports to parents in the corridor beside other people, and 
there could be disclosures to sexual abuse, there could be very, very, very 
sensitive information in those reports …’ (Solicitor, County 2) 
In addition to the issue of privacy, the Committee has also noted that it is not possible for a 
child to be effectively heard in an intimidating environment or one that is: 
‘… hostile, insensitive or inappropriate for her or his age. Proceedings must be 
both accessible and child-appropriate. Particular attention needs to be paid to the 
provision and delivery of child-friendly information, adequate support for self-
advocacy, appropriately trained staff, design of court rooms, clothing of judges, 
sight screens, and separate waiting rooms.’18 
The reality of child care proceedings, as illustrated by this research, paints a very different 
picture to that proposed by the Committee. Participants were almost unanimous in their 
opinion that the environment of the court itself, as currently experienced, is an unsuitable one 
for children. The possible negative connotations which the idea of ‘court’ might have in the 
child’s mind, and the tense and sometimes ‘intimidating’ atmosphere of the courthouse, were 
mentioned in this regard: 
‘It’s very intimidating. The association of a court is criminal, let’s be fair. We are 
often next to the criminal proceedings waiting for the judge …’ (Social Worker, 
County 1)  
‘They’re not particularly child friendly. There’s no children’s room here for 
instance. There’s no, as far as I’m aware there’s no witness waiting room or 
equivalent facility for a child. I know from being in practice how awful it is 
standing outside in that corridor.’ (Judge, County 2) 
One of the consistent themes that arose from the research is that – contrary to express 
provisions in the Child Care Act 199119 – it is common practice for criminal cases and child 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
103. 
18 Op cit n 3, at para 34. 
19 Section 29(3). 
9 
 
care proceedings to happen in close proximity to each other, both in time and location: 
‘Two weeks ago there was a knife fight outside the court from the criminal court 
… Now there are occasions where we would have young teenage children down 
there, it’s a wholly inappropriate scene to take young people to, do you know, to 
discuss their care … it’s not a place where family stuff should take place’ (Social 
Worker, County 1) 
‘… there is going to be a certain set there on the day, there’s going to be 
professionals, there’s going to be people involved in care proceedings, people 
involved in criminal proceedings and there’s going to be solicitors and guards and 
prison officers and exposing any young person or vulnerable person to that I 
would just query the whole system as to how they can be protected within that, 
you know.’ (Social Worker, County 3) 
Accordingly, it is clear that in a significant number of cases, child care proceedings in the 
Irish District Court fall far short of both of the essential pre-requisites to effective child 
participation. Not only are children not always provided with the information necessary to 
ensure effective involvement in the case affecting them; the environment of the courts is 
often not conducive to the creation of a safe, child-friendly space. 
Taking children’s views seriously 
While Article 12 does not require that the views of the child be determinative or conclusive, 
it does require that their views be taken into account. In this context, it has been 
acknowledged that ‘the fact that young children express themselves differently from adults 
does not justify dismissing them’.20 It has been pointed out that Article 12 ‘stipulates that 
simply listening to the child is insufficient; the views of the child have to be seriously 
considered when the child is capable of forming his or her own views’.21 Once a child has 
expressed his or her views, it is imperative that the court explains to what extent the views of 
the child were considered and why they were agreed or disagreed with. Santos Pais highlights 
the fact that participation cannot be genuine if it provides no opportunity for the child to 
understand the consequences and impact of his or her opinions and views.22 Thus, as part of 
the decision-making process, the court should explain to the child directly or indirectly, the 
extent to which his or her views were taken into consideration. How common an occurrence 
this type of judicial explanation is in the counties covered by this study remains unclear from 
the available data. Only one judge specifically referred to this aspect of the role: 
‘… it allows us then to get into that conversation about “well you know there is a 
decision coming up, the purpose of this meeting is for me to hear your views on 
that but at the end of the day I’m the person making the decision. I will take your 
views into consideration but I can’t guarantee that your views will be the decision 
that I’ll make but it’s something that I will pay a lot of attention to”.’ (Judge, 
County 2) 
                                                          
20 G Lansdown, Can you Hear Me? The Right of Young Children to Participate in Decisions Affecting Them: 36 Working 
Papers in Early Childhood Development (Bernard Van Leer Foundation, 1995), p 3. 
21 Op cit n 3, at para 28. 
22 M Santos Pais, Child Participation, Documentação e Direito Comparado, n 81/82 2000, available at: 
www.gddc.pt/actividade-editorial/pdfs-publicacoes/8182MartaPais.pdf, p 99. 
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Article 12 of the UNCRC envisages a two-stage process for eliciting the views of the child. 
The first stage is a determination of whether the child is capable of forming a view; if so, that 
child should be facilitated in expressing that view. The second stage involves deciding how 
much weight to attach to that view in the decision-making process; this is to be determined in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child. Article 12 acknowledges that children, 
similar to adults, have different levels of competence at different stages of their lives; they are 
not to be viewed as a homogenous group in society when it comes to being of sufficient 
maturity. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has accepted that maturity refers to the 
ability of the child to assess and comprehend the implications of a particular matter and in the 
context of Article 12, this means the capacity of the child to express her or his views on 
issues in a reasonable and independent way. 
It has been expressly acknowledged by the Committee that ‘[c]hildren’s levels of 
understanding are not uniformly linked to their biological age’.23 The degree to which the 
views of the child are taken seriously depends on their understanding of the issues concerned, 
according to both their age and maturity. The impact of the outcome on the life of the child 
must also be taken into consideration; the greater the impact, the more relevant the 
assessment of the maturity of that child.24 As Heneghan points out, ‘[i]f Article 12 is to have 
any meaning it must be the expression of views by the particular child on the particular 
child’s terms, as the particular child sees their world’.25 Accordingly, the degree to which a 
child is mature enough to make a decision or hold a view on a matter must be judged on a 
case-by-case basis, each child being treated as an individual in their own right.26  
In this study, when it came to children attending court, it became apparent that chronological 
age was by far the most common determining factor for the large majority of participants. 
Despite age being proposed so widely, there appeared to be no specific criteria or agreement 
around this. Some participants did speak of determining a child’s capacity for participation 
based on ‘maturity’ or ‘understanding’; however, for the majority who referred to 
chronological age, there was significant variance of opinion, often apparently derived from 
quite arbitrary beliefs. There was no uniform approach to the question of the age above which 
it becomes appropriate for children to be asked to express their views, although the transition 
into adolescence was commonly cited:  
‘only age appropriate cases, so I do it for … well usually the child by 9 or 10’ 
(Social Worker, County 1) 
‘I’d find it very difficult to involve a child of less than 12 in the proceedings. And 
why is that? Rigid thinking on capacity I guess …’ (Judge, County 1) 
‘I would say I haven’t seen any child under the age of 13 but it’s not necessarily 
that I put a strict rule on it but that has just been the reality of what has 
happened.’ (Judge, County 3) 
Some judges did refer to individual difference, development and maturity in children, 
unrelated to chronological age, in terms of considering ability to participate:  
                                                          
23 Op cit n 3, at para 29. 
24 Op cit n 3, at para 30. 
25 M Heneghan, ‘Children and Lawyers Acting for Children in Legal Proceedings – What does a child’s right to be heard in 
legal proceedings really mean?’: www.childjustice.org/docs/henaghan2005.pdf. Date last accessed: 23 September 2010. 
26 Op cit n 3, at para 29. 
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‘… really all children are so different. There are some very, very bright children 
who could participate in something like, at eight years and there are, you know 
kids who mightn’t fully be able to you know, participate at fifteen.’ (Judge, 
County 1) 
‘If the guardian says, “the young person wants to see the judge”, and if they are 
sufficiently mature and asking for this, I will see the child. The guardian will have 
given a pen picture of the child – level of maturity etc. The Court will note the 
chronological age of the child but more importantly their emotional and 
psychological age and level of understanding and any relevant mental health 
concerns.’ (Judge, County 2) 
While there was evidence of some professionals paying close attention to the difference 
between age and maturity, the tendency among professionals to rely on chronological age as 
a factor determining whether or not children are given the opportunity to express their views 
is concerning. 
Importance of the skills of the listener 
An additional barrier to meaningful participation in the proceedings is that children cannot 
have a voice if the professionals concerned are not adequately trained to hear them. A 
significant number of participants in this study expressed the view that the quality of the 
participatory experience for the child is directly influenced by the communication style and 
skill level of the judge concerned, which was seen to vary greatly from judge to judge: 
‘Some judges are suited to meeting children, some of them are not …’ (Barrister, 
County 2) 
‘I have had very good experiences where the judge has been excellent. I had one 
recently which was excellent and I think it was heard outside of the (named days 
of the week) and I thought it made an awful difference because he made a 
specific time to see this girl and it went extremely well. And he was good with 
her and she was good with him and I felt she got a hearing that day.’ (GAL, 
County 1) 
‘… some are really okay with it and comfortable and seem to ask all the right 
questions and manage it in the right way, and others you can see they’re doing 
their best, but they’re struggling with what am I supposed to say to this 15-year-
old or whatever.’ (GAL, County 2) 
‘I think it would depend on the judge. I think a child meeting Judge [X] in 
chambers would be fine. But … I suppose I just don’t think … Judge [Y] is child 
friendly, and I think he’d terrify the living daylights out of a child.’ (Solicitor, 
County 3) 
It emerged from the data that judges responsible for hearing child care proceedings may 
sometimes receive training in communicating with children and child development, but a 
significant number of judges will not have done so. This situation, combined with the 
unsuitable and non-conducive courtroom environments referred to earlier, was highlighted by 
some participants as informing their opinion that it was not in the best interests of children 
subject to child care proceedings to participate directly in the process: 
‘I can’t think of any circumstance in which I think it’s appropriate, where judges 
have no training as to how to communicate with children, so if there’s training 
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there and if there’s a capacity for a judge to learn how to go about doing that then 
maybe there’s scope for it.’ (Solicitor, County 1) 
Some judges themselves somewhat candidly echoed the views of other professional 
participants when outlining why they might not regard direct participation as preferable to 
less direct involvement 
‘… a guardian ad litem is appointed and they develop a relationship with the child 
over a number of months, it could even be into a year or two, that I feel I’m 
getting a much better picture of the reality of the child than I would in a snapshot 
of 30 minutes inside in the court chamber and I don’t feel adequately qualified to 
be assessing a child within that short period.’ (Judge, County 3) 
Thus, if direct participation is to be an available and effective option for children who are 
involved in child care proceedings, some level of judicial training in speaking with children 
would seem to be imperative. Positive steps have been taken in this regard in recent years, but 
there is scope for the expansion of judicial training to cover all areas and all judges.  
Participatory mechanisms 
In the Irish context, there are a number of mechanisms envisaged under the Child Care Act 
1991, which, in theory, allow for child participation of a direct and indirect nature. These 
include: a direct conversation between the child and the judge; the obligation to grant a 
request made by a child to be present at a hearing or at a particular part thereof, unless it 
would not, having regard to the age of the child or the nature of the proceedings, be in the 
child’s best interests; the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child (who is mandated 
to present both the views of the child as well as what he/she considers to be in the child’s best 
interests to the court); and finally, the child being joined as a party to the proceedings and 
represented by a solicitor. However, according to the insights of professionals who work 
within the system on a daily basis, it appears that the practical operation of these provisions 
of the Act does not necessarily reflect the spirit of Article 12 of the UNCRC. 
Direct participation 
Analogous to other jurisdictions, the primary mechanism through which the direct 
participation of children in Irish child care proceedings is facilitated is by way of a direct 
conversation between the child and the judge, either in chambers or in a cleared courtroom.27 
As with the other mechanisms, significant inconsistency arises from judge to judge and court 
to court in the frequency with which this occurs and the approach taken to it, a finding which 
largely corresponds to the experience in other countries.28 Within the current study, it was 
found that this practice occurs to some extent in County 2, but very infrequently in Counties 
1 and 3. In County 2, when this occurs, it mostly takes the form of judges meeting with the 
child, usually in chambers or in an empty courtroom with the Registrar and perhaps the GAL 
                                                          
27 R Hunter, ‘Close Encounters of a Judicial Kind: “Hearing” Children’s “Voices” in Family Law Proceedings’ [2007] 
CFLQ 283, at p 290. P Parkinson and J Cashmore, ‘Judicial Conversations with children in parenting disputes: the views of 
Australian Judges’ (2007) 21(2) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 160, p 168. 
28 F Raitt, ‘Judicial Discretion and Methods of Ascertaining the Views of the Child’ [2004] CFLQ 151, at p 156. P Tapp, 
‘Judges are Human Too: Conversation between the Judge and the Child as a means of giving effect to section 6 of the Care 
of Children Act 2004’ (2006) New Zealand Law Review 35. N Taylor and J Caldwell, ‘Judicial Meetings with Children: 
Documenting Practice within the New Zealand Family Court’ (2013) New Zealand Law Review 445, at p 462. 
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present: 
‘I’ve had children where I’ve brought them to meet the judge because they’ve 
either asked, or I’ve just felt the judge really needed to meet this child, to 
understand, to know what they were like and to hear what they have to say. And 
they’ve always been very amenable to that.’ (GAL, County 2) 
‘Well, we started off doing it in Chambers and one child said to me, “your room 
is lovely, Judge. Thanks for the biscuits. But I want to see where this happened. I 
want to sit in your chair.” And I thought about that and I thought, “why not?” 
There was nobody in court at the time. It was done at a time when the people 
weren’t there, because we bring them in at a time where they’re not going to be 
listening to the drama that goes on in court. So we had the meeting in an empty 
courtroom. The registrar was still working.’ (Judge, County 2) 
‘I have met a number of children who have been involved in the proceedings … 
to allow them opportunity to give me their views on their care situation and I 
have been extremely impressed by their ability to be able to do that, their ability 
to be able to participate in that way, their willingness to engage and the clarity 
that they can bring to making their views known. I think perhaps there is a 
traditional fear in bringing children into a courtroom that it’s not a place for a 
child but I think in these particular cases we really have to look at that again.’ 
(Judge, County 2) 
There are no quantitative statistics available on the frequency of such meetings; the data that 
is available suggests that it is (in the words of one social worker) ‘rare’, with indirect 
participation through the guardian ad litem being by far the more common approach. 
In County 3, the picture was mixed; one judge is not willing to meet with children, whereas 
another is occasionally willing to meet with older children: 
‘Children don’t get to go to court … they actually want to speak to the judge … 
but our court system is not set up in child care in relation to that.’ (Social Worker, 
County 3) 
‘… it’s not common for me to meet the children. I appoint the guardian ad litem 
but I have made it clear to the guardian ad litem if the child wants to see the judge 
and wishes to speak to me I will but I will not seek to get the child in … I would 
say I haven’t seen any child under the age of 13 but it’s not necessarily that I put 
a strict rule on it but that has just been the reality …’ (Judge, County 3) 
In County 1, participants indicated that it is rare for children to attend court or to be 
interviewed by judges, although it might very occasionally happen: 
‘I would never interview a child, even if the clerk was present and the child 
wanted to come into the room – I wouldn’t do it … There is no ideal kind of 
method of mediation. That’s why the guardian tends to be the best conduit for the 
child in those circumstances.’ (Judge, County 1) 
‘I tend to shy away from that. I don’t think it’s proper to expose a child to legal 
proceedings, coming to court, fretting and worrying. Occasionally if the child 
asks to see the judge, I will say of course, come in, come in. But generally I 
would ask her to come in accompanied, you know. But even then, it can be a little 
stilted … I would for my own protection or most judges for their own 
safeguarding would say, well the clerk will stay with us. So you end up, four 
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people in a room who have never really met, well just little or nothing in common 
with each other. So the opportunity for a deep and meaningful exchange and a 
heart to heart is limited.’ (Judge, County 1) 
Even when a private conversation with the judge was an option, there was a lack of 
consensus among participants about how exactly this should occur: 
‘There’s a whole different feel to a judge’s chambers, when you are being 
brought in then and you are felt much more welcome in a judge’s chambers than 
you would in an actual court setting.’ (Social Worker, County 1) 
‘The reason why I like to meet with the child in the courtroom is so that the child 
actually gets to see where the decisions are made and also the fact that there is the 
recording system within the court so we can utilise that because that recording 
system doesn’t extend to chambers so that we can keep a record of what is said 
and not said and what goes on …’ (Judge, County 2) 
Apart from direct conversations between judges and children, section 30(2) of the Child Care 
Act recognises a situation where a court is obliged to accede to a request by the child to be 
present at the hearing. However, this is immediately qualified by a proviso that the court does 
not have to accede to such a request where ‘having regard to the age of the child or the nature 
of the proceedings’ it would not be in the interests of the child. Generally, in practice, a 
request from a child to be present at a hearing will be in response to a professional asking 
them if they wish to be directly involved in this way. As children are not automatically 
parties to child care proceedings and rarely may be joined as a party at the discretion of the 
presiding judge, the question of attendance must be put to them by their social worker, or 
occasionally, their guardian ad litem. However, several such professionals described being 
less than encouraging when discussing this issue with children: 
‘I never invite the child until such a time as the judge has said “Why is Mary Jane 
not here” and then I will go “Want to go court?”, “No”, “Grand”, my car is 
skidding out of the actual car park …’ (Social Worker, County 1) 
‘I have had some very vulnerable teenagers who are not able for the court arena 
and I would be saying that in the report. I would also be saying that directly to the 
teenagers “I don’t think you’re able for it at the moment. We can talk about it 
again”.’ (GAL, County 1) 
This cautionary approach amongst social work practitioners towards children’s direct 
participation in the court process has not gone unrecognised by the judges involved: 
‘… my own understanding is that often the people they are speaking with will try 
to discourage them.’ (Judge, County 1) 
Some participants queried whether children were even being advised by the child care 
professionals working with them that direct participation in court was an option for them: 
‘In a guardian’s report I’ve never seen them say, “I’ve asked the child whether 
they want to come to court” …’ (Barrister, County 2) 
One judge stated that she/he will seek to ensure that the child has the opportunity to vindicate 
his/her rights in this respect: 
‘Children of sufficient age and understanding must be told that they have rights 
and options. They have rights under the legislation to be present for the hearing or 
part of the hearing. They have rights to come in and talk to the Judge. They have 
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rights if they’re mature enough to ask to discharge their guardian and to have a 
solicitor and be joined themselves as a party to the proceedings. And it becomes 
relevant if the guardian is telling me that the child or young person has very 
definitive views which are inconsistent with their welfare and those of the 
guardian. So we ask the guardians to outline for the young person their options at 
that point.’ (Judge, County 2) 
The picture that emerges from the data is that there is some degree of direct participation in 
County 2, although it is not commonplace, while it is almost non-existent in Counties 1 and 
3. The reasons given for this low level of direct participation varied, but what became 
apparent from the responses is that adult parties to the proceedings act as gatekeepers to child 
participation within the courts and determine whether a child will have a direct voice within 
proceedings of which they are the subject. In making this determination, a key consideration, 
particularly for social workers and GALs, is whether attendance at and participation in court 
proceedings is in the child’s best interests. As already outlined above, the current court 
environment, as experienced by the professional participants, was deemed in the vast 
majority of cases to be an inappropriate place to which to bring a child. Some participants 
held particularly strong views in this regard:  
‘I believe no child if it’s not necessary, life and death, has any place being inside 
in an actual courtroom’ (Social Worker, County 1) 
‘… you know children need to be kind of as far away from this process as 
possible to make life as normal as possible for them.’ (Social Worker, County 2) 
Some professionals considered not just the environment, but the content and significance of 
the proceedings also, in terms of the potential impact on that child: 
‘… the pressure of bringing the children into such a formal setting and where 
there is a huge expectation on them to get the judge to change his mind I think it’s 
quite emotionally abusive.’ (GAL, County 1) 
‘I think it depends on what message that child is then given by the judge and how 
that’s managed, or the child suddenly wants to see the judge every second week 
because they think they’re going to have the power to change their current 
circumstances. So I think it needs to be managed very delicately and it depends 
on the child and their age.’ (Social Worker, County 2) 
‘… a child coming in might feel that they’re being placed with the responsibility 
of the whole family scenario, they’re being put in a conflictual position and I take 
the view … it’s not common for me to meet the children. I appoint the guardian 
ad litem but I have made it clear to the guardian ad litem if the child wants to see 
the judge and wishes to speak to me I will but I will not seek to get the child in.’ 
(Judge, County 3) 
Interestingly, judges from one county in particular shared the cautions and concerns of the 
other professionals involved in respect of the direct participation of children in the court 
proceedings affecting them. The reasons given by these judges mirrored those expressed by 
other participants, and tended to concentrate on the prospect of children giving evidence 
rather than on children simply being present:  
‘I would try to avoid calling children to give evidence in most types of family law 
proceedings, because it would tend to polarise them on one side’ (Judge, County 
1) 
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‘I don’t think it’s proper to expose a child to legal proceedings, coming to court, 
fretting and worrying …’ (Judge, County 1) 
‘I mean, I’ve had guardians say, “Judge – the child wants to speak to you” (well, 
now, in court, that would be). And I’ve had then – I have to be very careful there, 
because the child gets into the witness box, and the next thing is, the lawyer for 
mother or the father wants to cross-examine the child. So you have to be kind of, 
well, “this is tricky now” – you know? If somebody wants to come into an 
adversarial system, they’re entitled to – the other side are entitled to cross-
examine. So this is where – I spoke about this welfare paradigm competing – and 
this inquisitorial paradigm – competing with the adversarial’ (Judge, County 1) 
The latter reference to the right to cross-examine, while legally speaking is a rule of evidence, 
is yet another example of the Irish courts using the voice of the child for forensic purposes, 
something which is at odds with international best practice since the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child has made it clear that facilitating expression of the child’s views is for the benefit 
of the child concerned and is not to be used as evidence in court proceedings.  
One judge, whilst acknowledging the dilemmas inherent in inviting children to participate 
directly within the court process, highlighted that the initial presumption should always be 
that such participation is their right: 
‘I think the starting point is that they are entitled to a level of participation in 
proceedings. They are at the centre of it and they need to have that. I appreciate 
that people have strong views about children not being in court and not being 
involved in the process. But on balance, I think I’ve had an opinion about the 
traumatic or the potential trauma for children being involved in court 
proceedings. That would be involved now at the extent of being cross-examined 
and so on so forth. The opinion was that for some children it could be very 
damaging. For some children it could be cathartic. The problem is you wouldn’t 
know for 30 years which one it was.’ (Judge, County 2) 
Of all the professional groupings, solicitors, barristers and judges were the most likely to see 
qualified positives in a child being present in court within the current system.  
‘… if you are of a certain age of maturity that you are able to sort of be in that 
environment and listen to other people decision-making or speaking about you, 
you can, you are a stakeholder, you’ve a place at the table people will listen to 
what it is you have to say, but there’s a trade-off there.’ (Solicitor, County 1) 
There was a clear majority opinion amongst all professional groups that direct participation 
by children within child care proceedings is welcome in theory. However, for some, it is the 
reality of the current experience that is deemed far from ideal for the child. This reality 
included the intimidating environments already mentioned, and the adversarial nature of the 
process into which the child would be entering. The overriding message was that the system 
as it currently operates is not a child friendly or even ‘safe’ environment for a child, and some 
spoke of a need to create different systems and environments to facilitate greater direct child 
participation:  
‘We don’t work within a setting that has a way of including children safely at the 
moment and I think if that was there we would do it and we would look at it case 
by case’ (Social Worker, County 1) 
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Guardian ad litem 
Section 26(1) of the Child Care Act 1991 provides for the appointment of a GAL in 
circumstances where it is ‘necessary in the interests of the child and in the interests of justice 
to do so’. Unlike other jurisdictions where the GAL model exists,29 the Act provides little 
guidance on the circumstances in which a GAL might be appointed, beyond the fact that the 
child cannot already be a party to the proceedings if a GAL is to be appointed. Moreover, 
there are no provisions in the Act itself concerning the role of the GAL in such proceedings 
or the qualifications that a GAL should have.30 The accepted role of the GAL that has 
evolved is a dual role of communicating the child’s wishes to the court, and advising the 
court on the child’s best interests.31 In 2009, the Children’s Acts Advisory Board (CAAB) 
issued non-binding guidance on the role and qualifications of the GAL, as well as some 
limited guidance on when a GAL might be appointed, including factors such as the 
complexity of the case, the ability of the child concerned to express his/her feelings, the 
presence of an issue about a child’s identity or nationality or where the child’s liberty is at 
risk.32 As this guidance has no legal weight, it tends to fall entirely to the discretion of the 
individual judge to decide on whether to appoint a GAL.  
In this study, the frequency of GAL appointment varied significantly across counties. In 
County 1 it was experienced as the exception rather than the norm:  
‘I can go to a court and see a list of 30 cases and I can hear that there are 
guardians appointed in two or three of those, you know that’s just the straw poll 
on a given [day] …’ (Solicitor, County 1) 
In County 2 by contrast, the opposite situation pertains, and GALs are appointed in the 
majority of cases:  
‘… judges want guardians, most of them want guardians to tell them, like, that’s 
the CFA position, what do you think is in the best interests of the child. An 
independent view on it. They’re reluctant to let guardians out.’ (Barrister, County 
2) 
‘… we have a high level of guardian ad litem associated with cases …’ (Social 
Worker, County 2) 
‘Well, there would be guardians in I think the majority of cases that would come 
                                                          
29 In Northern Ireland, the Guardian Ad Litem Agency (NIGALA) was established under the Guardians Ad Litem (panel) 
Regulations (Northern Ireland 1996 (SI 1996/128) in accordance with the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 (SI 
1995/755), art 60(7). For further information see: www.nigala.hscni.net/. Similarly in Scotland, a curator ad litem is 
appointed in welfare proceedings where the child is too young to engage separate legal representation. This person may 
possess a legal or social work qualification. Safeguarders are appointed in Scotland in the non-adversarial children’s 
hearings where it is considered necessary to do so in accordance with the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. C Donnelly, 
‘Reflections of a Guardian Ad Litem on the Participation of Looked-after Children in Public Law Proceedings’ (2010) 16(2) 
Child Care in Practice (2010) 181. L Davis, ‘In Practice: Children in Court’ [2007] Fam Law 65. A Bilson and S White, 
‘Representing Children’s Views and Best Interests in Court: An International Comparison’ (2005) Child Abuse Review 220. 
30 See further N Carr, ‘Guiding the GALs: A Case of Hesitant Policy-making in the Republic of Ireland’ (2009) 12(3) Irish 
Journal of Family Law 60. 
31 See A McWilliams and C Hamilton, ‘“There isn’t anything like a GAL”: The Guardian ad litem Service in Ireland’ (2010) 
10(1) Irish Journal of Applied Social Studies 31. 
32 Children’s Acts Advisory Board, Giving a voice to children’s wishes, feelings and interests (Children’s Acts Advisory 
Board, 2009), available at: www.caab.ie/Publications/PDFs---Publications/Giving-a-Voice-to-Childrens-Wishes,-Feelings-
and-I.aspx), pp 6 and 9–10. 
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before us, particularly cases that are going on for a period of time.’ (Judge, 
County 2) 
In County 3, a discrepancy was evident as between judges in the county: one solicitor 
observed that one judge would appoint GALs in ‘three, maybe four’ out of every 10 cases, 
whereas another judge ‘would be almost 10 out of 10’. (The latter judge confirmed this, 
stating that GALs are ‘invariably’ appointed.) 
There is no definitive published information relating to the frequency of GAL appointment in 
child care cases currently available. While the evidence presented above is relatively limited 
from a quantitative perspective, it is broadly consistent with the findings of the Child Care 
Law Reporting Project, which indicates that GALs were appointed in half of the cases 
covered by the project in 2013–14 (which accounted for approximately 20 per cent of all 
applications nationally), with regional variations in the rate of appointment from just 17.9 per 
cent in one venue to over 80 per cent in another.33 Clearly, therefore, there is little 
consistency in how judges choose to exercise the discretion granted to them by the 
legislation. 
Attitudes towards the guardian ad litem role varied significantly between professionals, 
dependent upon the participants’ experiences. Solicitors were more likely to identify positives 
in the appointment of a GAL (although this view was not unanimous): 
‘The top of the pile is the person who has both the skill and communication with 
the children … I have great respect and great time and I have great regard for the 
positive contribution to the decision-making that the guardian’s report makes … 
let’s see that as the optimum in our system at present in terms of representing 
children and children’s participation in the process.’ (Solicitor, County 1) 
‘I would rely a lot on what the guardian has to say, and I would talk a lot to the 
guardian as to what they think is happening here. How are they finding the client? 
I find them a great source of help usually. Even if they do end up agreeing with 
the social workers, I tend to kind of get to the root of why they’re agreeing with 
the social workers and what’s the rationale behind it.’ (Solicitor, County 3) 
However, this perceived level of skill was not the experience of many other participants, who 
identified variations in the quality of practice across guardians. Some participants explained 
these differences in quality, as earlier outlined, as a result of lack of definition and regulation 
of the guardian role, and this was perceived almost universally as a deficit in the service; 
‘My sense is, you know, the role of the guardian ad litem is unclear. I think it’s 
unclear for the court, I think it’s unclear for the guardians, I think it’s unclear for 
the social workers, I think it’s unclear from the general society. You know, I 
don’t think it’s defined clearly.’ (Social Worker, County 3) 
This lack of clarity was acknowledged by the guardians themselves, who also articulated a 
number of other challenges to their role, including its intrinsic duality, the risk of losing focus 
on the interests of the child within an adversarial court process, and a perceived duty to 
attempt to calm the often choppy waters of the child care proceedings process: 
‘I think it can be a contradictory role at times, so you have a child’s wishes and 
                                                          
33 C Coulter, Second Interim Report: Child Care Law Reporting Project (October 2014), available at: 
www.childlawproject.ie/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Interim-report-2-Web.pdf, pp 7, 10 and 61. 
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feelings and you’ve got what’s in the child’s best interest, so while you can 
advocate for the child and put forward the child’s opinion, you may not agree 
with the child in terms of what the child’s best interests are and I think that’s 
usually when the battle happens in court. You very rarely will get any issues 
around what the child is saying, everybody is usually very accepting of the child’s 
opinion and the child’s wishes and feelings, but usually it’s the piece around what 
is in the child’s best interest and particularly if you aren’t agreeing with the child 
sometimes that can be perceived as you undermining the child and the child’s 
wishes and feelings.’ (GAL, County 1) 
A number of social workers described tensions between their own role and that of the 
guardians, sometimes as a result of the two roles being seen to overlap. Social workers stated 
that the child’s wishes and views are commonly incorporated into the reports that they write 
for court. However, given the discretionary nature of what is included in the social work 
report, it is possible that children will not always be guaranteed an input into the outcome of 
the proceedings. It should also be noted that a social work report, coming as it does from a 
party seeking a particular outcome to the proceedings, lacks a certain quality of impartiality. 
How much detail is given in social work reports, and whether the potential gravity of the 
court proceedings and their potential consequences are discussed with the child, is unclear: 
‘I’d always bring the wishes of the child into the court and report to the judge, 
whether I’m agreeing with it or not makes no … I mean, for example, I went up 
to visit the children last Monday, told them we are going for another care order, 
they said we don’t want to be in care, blah, blah, blah; that goes into my court 
report that these are the wishes of the child, so I feel that that is very much my job 
I suppose really in relation to bringing forth the wishes of the child and their 
opinion in relation to care orders and their opinion in relation to what the outcome 
they would like to see.’ (Social Worker, County 1) 
‘I mean like the HSE [Health Service Executive – now Child and Family Agency] 
reports will all have a section in it [about] what the child wants.’ (Judge, County 
1) 
‘I think people forget about this, but that’s our role.’ (Social Worker, County 2) 
‘Yes, I suppose like in my report I would outline as well like you know the 
child’s wishes, whether they want to go home or not if it’s appropriate depending 
on their age but I would include that in my own report. So there’s a little bit of 
duplication I think there too.’ (Social Worker, County 3) 
Some social workers experienced the GAL’s opinions being given more weight in court than 
their own: 
‘… we have a high level of guardian ad litem associated with cases, which speaks 
volumes to me; we have no credibility when we go to court. Why do you need a 
GAL for such cases, sometimes, do you know what I mean? Because our job is to 
gain the wishes of the child and the voice of a child anyway. I get it on some 
cases, but I just think that guardian ad litem is going to be listened to more than 
social workers …’ (Social Worker, County 2) 
‘As a social worker and obviously my role would also be to represent what’s in 
the children’s best wishes and sometimes I suppose, sometimes I feel that maybe 
the role of the guardian ad litem kind of maybe undermines that role a little bit … 
we might have been working with families for a long time and have built up 
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relationships with the children and are equally able to advocate on what’s in their 
best interests …’ (Social Worker, County 3) 
Judges, for their part, saw a role for the guardian in speaking on behalf of the child in 
situations where direct child participation in the court might be inadvisable; to advise the 
court as to whether a child wishes to participate directly, or to facilitate the use of creative 
methods of participation:  
‘Well the guardians will often bring letters from children, worksheets, workbooks 
from children, you know, I think we’re as limited as our imaginations can be 
there in ensuring that the child can indirectly participate in proceedings.’ (Judge, 
County 2) 
‘Now, they would have been transferred to me by the guardian ad litem, in other 
words “Johnny asked me to give you this letter”, okay. And you see within that 
letter I might know there’s a desire for that child to actually speak to me so I 
would say, we’ll just say Johnny, “Would you tell Johnny I received his letter”, I 
would tell the guardian ad litem “this is my response and if Johnny wants to talk 
to me about anything etc., etc., then I’d be very happy to meet him” or her. So I 
would leave the control back with the child to decide do I want to meet the judge 
or don’t I.’ (Judge, County 3) 
Interestingly, one judge highlighted a new practice in their court, perhaps in an attempt to 
standardise the role somewhat in response to the types of concerns expressed by the 
participants above: 
‘… we’ve started a practice, which I don’t know was universally welcomed by 
guardians, to begin with, of saying that the guardian must, (A): engage with the 
child. The task required of the guardian isn’t a paper analysis. The guardian must 
engage with the child regularly, even when the child is non-verbal. … (B): tell the 
judge whether the guardian feels what their level of maturity is and whether their 
view fits reasonably with their welfare (as perceived by the guardian).’ (Judge, 
County 2) 
The guardian ad litem is clearly the most common mechanism through which children are 
afforded the opportunity to express their views and participate in child care proceedings in 
Ireland. Nonetheless, over 20 years after its introduction, it remains replete with difficulties 
surrounding a lack of clarity on key issues such as function, criteria for appointment and 
qualifications, as well as inconsistency in rates of and reasons for appointment. It is thus 
welcome that plans have been recently announced for an extensive reform of the GAL 
system, including status, roles and responsibilities, the qualifications and criteria for the 
appointment of GALs, their legal representation and the management of a transparent 
service.34 
The child joined as a party to proceedings 
Section 25 of the 1991 Act provides that in any case where the court is considering the 
granting of an order in relation to the child, the child may be joined as a party to the 
proceedings and be afforded separate legal representation at the hearing. It is important to 
note that, as with the appointment of GALs, it is within the discretion of the court as to 
                                                          
34 F Gartland, ‘Department planning “extensive reform” of guardian scheme’, The Irish Times, 9 June 2015. 
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whether or not such an order should be made. The court must be satisfied that it is in the 
interests of justice and in the interests of the child concerned. Ward has noted that ‘the need 
for separate representation will probably only arise in the case of older children who have a 
level and degree of understanding of their circumstances’.35 If, having considered the age, 
understanding and the wishes of the child concerned, the court is of the opinion that a 
separate legal representative should be appointed for the child, then any order appointing a 
GAL in that case will automatically cease. This is unlike the system in the United Kingdom 
which allows for dual representation of the child through the appointment of both a GAL and 
a separate representative for the child – and was once termed the ‘Rolls Royce’ of child care 
representation.36 
In cases where the child is made a party to the proceedings, the court can direct the extent of 
their involvement in practice. They may be allowed to attend some or all of the case 
concerned. The restrictive nature of this provision in terms of the agency given to the child 
concerned is manifest, particularly where it allows the court to direct that counsel be 
appointed for the child. Section 25(3) provides that the power of the court to join the child as 
a party to the proceedings will not prejudice an application by the child to be present at the 
hearing of proceedings. 
While this mechanism is a positive one in theory, the extent to which it is used in practice is 
rare. The Child Care Law Reporting Project indicates that of 486 cases covered by the Project 
across the country in 2013–14, children were represented by a solicitor in just seven.37 For 
the three counties covered by this study, the data suggests that solicitors are rarely used as a 
method of indirect participation for children, especially in Counties 2 and 3: 
‘Only once in my time [20 years] doing these cases has a child actually been 
joined to the proceedings and instructed a solicitor.’ (Solicitor, County 3) 
‘That would be very infrequent.’ (Judge, County 2) 
‘I’ve only ever heard of it once.’ (Social Worker, County 2) 
In County 1, this mechanism, while still relatively unusual on the whole, is often used by one 
particular judge for ‘older children’ (GAL) or ‘difficult teenagers’ (SW) from approximately 
the age of 14 upwards. 
‘I believe one of the new trends that’s happening in the [County 1] District Court 
when you’re talking about teenagers or older teenagers that one of the judges is 
appointing solicitors to represent the children as opposed to a guardian ad litem 
representing the children because there is this considered view that once the 
children reach a certain age that they can instruct a solicitor’ (GAL, County 1)  
Numerous participants (including solicitors themselves) were of the view that representation 
by a solicitor was not the preferred route of indirect participation for children in child care 
proceedings. The reasons given for this included lack of training and skills-set in 
communicating with children:  
                                                          
35 P Ward, The Child Care Acts – Annotated and Consolidated (Thomson Roundhall, 2nd edn, 2005) p 109. 
36 Mabon v Mabon and Others [2005] EWCA Civ 634, [2005] Fam 366, para [25]. See also Family Justice Review, Final 
Report (November 2011): www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/217343/family-justice-
review-final-report.pdf, para 95.  
37 C Coulter, Second Interim Report: Child Care Law Reporting Project (October 2014), available at: 
www.childlawproject.ie/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Interim-report-2-Web.pdf, pp 7 and 61. 
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‘I don’t have that training … the guardian has which is the 5 years post-
qualification social work experience … in that case it’s a case of doing the best 
you can beyond simply representing what the child is dryly telling you as our 
legal instructions.’ (Solicitor, County 1) 
Despite the relatively rare appointment of solicitors to represent children in these 
proceedings, and the expressed reservations about the appropriateness and use of the role, the 
positive aspects of involvement of the solicitor in representing the child, as opposed to other 
indirect methods, was outlined in this example by one participant: 
‘I actually thought it worked out very well because as distinct from a guardian ad 
litem that comes from a social work background … In this particular case, I 
suppose this is only in the last 6 months, I spoke to the solicitor who was very 
competent in the area and he pointed out what his client, a 16-and-a-half-year-old 
boy was saying, all seemed very reasonable to me. Fortunately, the principal 
social worker was in court, I said this is what they’re saying, it seems to me to be 
reasonable, what do you think? Yeah, we’ll do that, we’ll do that, we ended up 
withdrawing the proceedings, the application for supervision order, on the basis 
that the child was saying to his solicitor directly … if you have somebody there 
beyond the social work framework, you know, I think sometimes you can get a 
clearer view that it’s not, you know muddled in with other issues.’ (Solicitor, 
County 3) 
Given the difficulties surrounding the use of the GAL in child care proceedings, it is not 
surprising that similar difficulties and inconsistencies have arisen (albeit to a lesser extent) 
around the use of solicitors to separately represent a child. This mechanism clearly offers 
distinct benefits that are not provided by a GAL, and therefore it should be maintained as an 
option; if it is to achieve its potential, steps need to be taken to adequately train solicitors to 
perform this role, and to clarify for judges when a solicitor might be appointed. The mutual 
exclusivity of GALs and solicitors is potentially a significant barrier to the appointment of 
solicitors, particularly in areas with high levels of GAL appointments, and this should be 
reconsidered. 
Discussion 
This study has identified a number of aspects of the current operation of child care 
proceedings in Ireland which appear to be non-compliant with international minimum 
standards as set out by Article 12 UNCRC in respect of effective and meaningful child 
participation. According to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, the actual wording 
of Article 12 leaves no room for discretion on the part of states parties.38 In fact, it places a 
‘strict obligation’ on states parties to fully implement this right for all children.39 Since 
Article 12 applies to all children capable of forming views, the Committee has specifically 
discouraged states parties from introducing age limits both in law and in practice which may 
impact on the effective implementation of this fundamental right.40 Thus, in theory, in 
accordance with Article 12, all children capable of forming views should have the 
                                                          
38 Op cit n 3, at para 18(a)(i). 
39 Op cit n 3, at para 18(a)(i). 
40 Op cit n 3, at para 21. 
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opportunity to express their views in child care proceedings.41 In principle, this provision 
entitles even very young children who are capable of forming views to have a voice in child 
care proceedings, regardless of the means through which they express themselves.42 The 
evidence collected in this study suggests that very young children are facilitated in 
participating (whether directly or indirectly) in child care proceedings in Ireland to a 
significantly lesser degree than older children. 
Despite child care proceedings, by definition, focusing on the welfare and protection needs of 
specific children, it is unclear from our data whether all children are even informed that they 
are at the centre of child care proceedings and that they have a right to a voice therein. 
Furthermore, it appears that very few children participate directly (by means of attendance at 
court) in the proceedings, which will have a significant role in determining their future care 
and living arrangements. As far as indirect participation is concerned, child representation by 
a solicitor was found to be very rare. Appointment of a GAL was more common; however, 
the level of such appointment is inconsistent across the country and even within individual 
courts. Children are rarely, if ever, given the ability to choose the manner in which they 
participate in the case. Thus, there is no standard practice across Ireland concerning whether 
or not children will be heard in child care proceedings affecting them and as a consequence, 
no guarantee that their voices will be heard.  
In the current system as it stands, there appears to be no criteria or guidelines for any of the 
involved professionals regarding when a child should or should not be directly involved in 
these proceedings. It is these adult professionals – social workers, solicitors, judges and 
GALs – who are the decision makers and gatekeepers to the court proceedings for the 
children concerned. There is a consensus across professions that child participation is a good 
thing in theory but that Irish child care proceedings are not conducive to this in practice. This 
does not appear to be based on an ideology/belief system that is opposed to children’s 
participation per se, but rather is a response to the current child care proceedings model in 
place, where the court environment is viewed as an intimidating one, with an adversarial 
model at its centre and an absence of a supportive, child-friendly process through which the 
child might participate safely and openly. Thus, while professionals claim to be in favour of 
child participation in the theoretical context of an ideal system, some might argue that this 
lets them off the hook in terms of facilitating children being heard under the existing 
framework. 
It should be noted that there have been multiple calls for the establishment of a specialist 
family court in Ireland, and indeed we have argued elsewhere that the evidence presented in 
this study shows that such a reform is long overdue.43 Thus, in the event that a specialist 
family court is established, the openness to change of the current professionals working 
within the system would be put to the test. That said, even in the absence of a specialist court, 
there are some measures that can be adopted in the meantime which could serve to create a 
more child-friendly environment for implementation. These include care proceedings being 
held in separate care only sessions in separate buildings from regular legal proceedings; 
                                                          
41 Indeed the Committee has asserted that ‘Article 12 applies both to younger and to older children’. UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, General Comment No 7 (2005) on Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood, UN Doc 
CRC/C/GC/7 (1 November 2005), para 14. 
42 Op cit n 3, at 1. 
43 See C O’Mahony, K Burns, A Parkes and C Shore, ‘Child Care Proceedings in Non-Specialist Courts: Lessons from 
Ireland’ (2016) 30 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family (in press). 
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shedding some light on the level of judicial training in this area so that gaps can be identified 
and addressed;44 and finally, increasing resources with a particular emphasis on regulating 
the training and supply of GALs for such proceedings. 
Conclusion 
The recent announcement of the reform of the GAL service is welcome, as is the approval in 
a referendum of a constitutional amendment on children’s rights in 2012. Significantly, the 
wording of the amendment mirrors that of Article 12 by providing that legal provision will be 
made to ensure that the views of children capable of forming views must be ascertained and 
any decision that is made must prioritise the best interests of the child. This reform, if 
properly implemented, has the potential to have a significant impact by making it mandatory 
to hear the views of children in child care proceedings, rather than discretionary as is 
currently the case. A legal challenge to the outcome of the referendum meant that the 
amendment did not become law until May 2015; at the time of writing, it remains to be seen 
how this constitutional obligation will be translated into legislation and practice. The findings 
of this study demonstrate that full and effective implementation of this right will require more 
than a few lines of legislation or policy. The courtroom environment needs to be made more 
child-friendly, and professionals such as judges and solicitors will require uniform levels of 
training in communicating with, and hearing the voices of children through a variety of child 
appropriate ways. This will of course require resources, but also changes in practices and 
cultures such that children are provided with adequate information to participate in an 
informed manner; that their views are taken seriously once expressed, and that they are kept 
informed of the decisions taken and the reasons underpinning these decisions.  
                                                          
44 In New Zealand for example, there are guidelines in place for judicial conversations with children. See: 
www.justice.govt.nz/family-justice/about-us/info-for-providers/info-for-lawyers/judges-guidelines-decisions-with-children. 
See also J Boshier, ‘International Family Justice from a New Zealand Perspective’ (2008) International Family Law 149.  
